This article examines the factors that influence whether members of Congress tweet about the #MeToo movement. Whereas social-identity theory suggests that congresswomen would be more likely to tweet about #MeToo, congressional research argues that increased polarization has resulted in congresswomen bucking gender stereotypes and embracing more partisan behavior than might otherwise be expected (Pearson and Dancey 2011). We examine how gender, partisanship, and ideology shape the Twitter activity of members of Congress surrounding the #MeToo movement using an original dataset of their tweets since October 2017 when the #MeToo movement gained prominence on Twitter. Our findings show that gender and ideology are the strongest predictors of whether Congress members tweet about the #MeToo movement. Liberals—particularly liberal women—are leading the charge in bringing prominence to the #MeToo movement on Twitter.

This article considers whether candidates strategically use emotional rhetoric in social media messages similar to the way that fear appeals are used strategically in televised campaign advertisements. We use a dataset of tweets issued by the campaign accounts of candidates for the US House of Representatives during the last two months of the 2018 midterm elections to determine whether candidate vulnerability predicts the presence of certain emotions in social media messages. Contrary to theoretical expectations, we find that vulnerability does not appear to inspire candidates to use more anxious language in their tweets. However, we do find evidence of a surprising relationship between sad rhetoric and vulnerability and that campaign context influences the use of other forms of negative rhetoric in tweets.

Previous literature on partisan campaign behavior shows that third-party candidates do not have the same presence online as major-party candidates, and these differences have been linked regularly to campaign finance. Twitter, however, has changed the online campaigning game. Because Twitter essentially is free, third-party candidates can even the playing field with major-party candidates who have more financial resources. The question asked in this article is whether this is actually the case. Evans, Cordova, and Sipole (2014) showed that in 2012, third-party candidates were less likely to have accounts on Twitter; however, those who had accounts tweeted more often than major party candidates. This article updates those findings to consider the behavior of third-party candidates during the 2014 and 2016 congressional races. Using a dataset of all candidates for both the US House and the US Senate, we show that the gap has begun to close between major- and minor-party candidates on Twitter. Third-party candidates, however, continue to have a different way of communicating with their followers on Twitter when compared to Democrats and Republicans.

While there has been a growth in the number of published studies about how candidates for the U.S. House and Senate use Twitter, candidates for president have been largely ignored. In this article, we examine the way the two 2016 presidential candidates communicated on Twitter. Using a content analysis of all tweets sent from Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump’s accounts from July 1 to Election Day, we explore whether the two candidates used this social network in the same ways, stressed similar policy issues, and were equally likely to “go negative” online.

Following the work of Evans, Cordova, and Sipole, we examine the way that candidates for congressional seats in 2014 used Twitter during the last 2 months of their campaign. Using a content analysis of every tweet sent by all candidates for both the US House and Senate, we show that particular individual-level and campaign-specific characteristics are related to whether and how often candidates go negative on Twitter. In particular, we show that there are differences based on competitiveness, incumbency, gender, and partisanship

Recent work by Evans, Cordova, and Sipole (2014) reveals that in the two months leading up to the 2012 election, female House candidates used the social media site Twitter more often than male candidates. Not only did female candidates tweet more often, but they also spent more time attacking their opponents and discussing important issues in American politics. In this article, we examine whether the female winners of those races acted differently than the male winners in the 2012 election, and whether they differed in their tweeting‐style during two months in the summer of 2013. Using a hand‐coded content analysis of every tweet from each member in the U.S. House of Representatives in June and July of 2013, we show that women differ from their male colleagues in their frequency and type of tweeting, and note some key differences between the period during the election and the period after. This article suggests that context greatly affects representatives' Twitter‐style.

We investigate the Twitter activity of all congressional candidates leading up to the 2012 U.S. House elections to assess whether there are significant differences in the tone and content of the tweets from male and female candidates. We argue that the electoral environment will have a significant effect over whether candidates engage in negative tweeting, address political issues, and discuss so-called “women’s issues” on Twitter. We find that gender has both a direct and contextual effect on candidates’ communication style on Twitter. Female candidates tweet significantly more “attack-style” messages than their male counterparts, discuss policy issues at a significantly higher rate, and women representatives focus more on “women’s issues.” We also find strong contextual effects in races with more female candidates: There is significantly more tweeting about political issues as well as significantly more negative attack-style tweets. However, with more female candidates, the number of tweets about “women’s issues” declines.

Purpose Recent research has shown that female US House candidates were more likely to talk about so-called “female issues” on Twitter during the 2012 election (Evans and Clark, 2015). In this paper, the author extends this former work by investigating the Twitter activity of all US House representatives during their 2012 election and seven months later (June and July of 2013). The purpose of this paper is to show that women do talk more about “female issues” than men, but do not only focus on these issues. Design/methodology/approach This paper content analyzes the tweets sent by female and male representatives in the 113th Congress during their 2012 elections, and seven months later. Findings Female representatives spend significantly more time devoted to “female issues” on Twitter than male representatives, but their time is not dominated entirely by “female issues.”

Given the decline in political engagement among the electorate, especially among youth, there has been an effort to increase engagement through service-learning courses at both the high school and college levels. The research that exists regarding the effects of these courses on students is mixed. Some studies show that students become more civically engaged and increase their political efficacy, but these effects are found in courses tied specifically to politics. Other studies involving courses from other disciplines show no effect. Using a longitudinal study gathered at two points in time (when students enter their college career and are graduating), I show that students who take a service-learning course are more likely to engage politically (especially online) and report significantly higher levels of political efficacy. These results hold for students overall regardless of the subject of the course.

In a recent study regarding online lecture videos, Evans shows that lecture videos are not superior to still slides. Using two Introduction to American Government courses, taught in a 4-week summer session, she shows that students in a non-video course had higher satisfaction with the course and instructor and performed better on exams than those in a course with lecture videos. In this follow-up study, we examine whether the same findings hold over a longer, more traditional semester with more students. Like Evans , we find that in a longer semester, students in a non-video course reported higher satisfaction, but, unlike Evans , students in the video section did better on exams. The implications of these findings for Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) are explored.

Lecture videos are often praised as a great medium of instruction in online education. There is a lack of research, however, that tests whether videos are superior to other teaching tools in online classes. This article examines whether videos are better than lecture notes and still slides in an online introductory political science course. The results show that lecture videos might not be the best tool of instruction for introductory students. Students in the non-video course gave higher evaluations of the instructor and the course and scored higher on exams.

This article examines how House candidates used Twitter during the 2012 campaign. Using a content analysis of every tweet from each candidate for the House in the final two months before the 2012 election, this study provides a snapshot of House candidates’ “Twitter style.” In particular, this article shows that incumbents, Democrats, women, and those in competitive races tweet differently than challengers, Republicans, minor party candidates, men, and those in safe districts.

Research on U.S. congressional elections has placed great emphasis on the role of competitiveness, which is associated with high levels of campaign spending, media coverage, and interest group and party involvement. Competitive campaigns have been found to increase citizens' participation, engagement and learning. However, little is known about whether the effects of competitive campaigns have enduring consequences for citizens' attitudes and behavior. Analyzing a survey of citizens conducted one year after the 2006 congressional elections that includes an oversample of respondents from competitive House races, we examine whether exposure to a competitive House campaign affects voters' political knowledge and political interest as well as their consumption of political news. We find that competitive elections have positive effects that endure for at least a year beyond the campaign season, reinforcing the idea that political competition plays a robust role in American representative democracy.

•In Brunell's recent work, he argues that competitive elections negatively affect congressional approval.•This study tests whether competitive elections affect congressional approval during and after an election.•This study uses data from the 2010 and 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.•Competitive elections affected congressional approval in 2010, but the effect does not last..

In this article, the author addresses both the costs and benefits of implementing clickers into an introductory political science course. Comparing student responses to a mid-semester survey in both a clicker and non-clicker course, the results show that students have higher satisfaction of the course and instructor, higher exam scores, and feel more comfortable participating in class when using clickers. The author finds that the benefits of using clickers in a large introductory course greatly outweigh the costs and encourages others to try the technology.

This article explores the relationship between individual-level sociability and political engagement. While some evidence exists that individual-level sociability may be related to political engagement and interest, little is known about the ways in which sociability affects participation in different forms of political activity, particularly newer forms of online political engagement. Using data from the 2009 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we explore the ways in which individual-level sociability affects political engagement in a range of activities, including online political discussions. We find sociability levels affected some activities more than others. Sociability has no impact on more socially isolated political activities such as voter registration and voting, but greatly impacts engagement in political activities involving a higher degree of social interaction, such as attending a meeting where a member of Congress was present and discussing politics with others, both in person and online. These findings help explain longstanding questions about the factors that motivate participation in traditional political activities as well as newer online forms of political engagement.

Publication in scholarly journals is a key to scholarly success. However, previous studies have shown that across many disciplines, including political science, women publish significantly less than men and prefer to use qualitative methodology. In this article, we explore the accuracy of these trends by examining a decade's worth (2000–09) of women's publications in four top political science journals (the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, and PS: Political Science and Politics). Using a systematic content analysis, we determine the gender ratio of the authors, funding sources, methods, and the ratio of qualitative and quantitative studies. We find that while women publish less than men in each of these venues, their publication rates resemble their representation in the field.

Scholarly publication in peer-reviewed journals is widely regarded as the road to scholarly success. However, in a diversity of fields such as sociology, economics, and political science, it has been shown that the rate of publication is much lower for women than for men. The question of whether a systematic relationship exists between gender and research methods has also frequently been debated. In this paper, we explore patterns of authorship and scholarship in two influential interdisciplinary journals, Political Communication and the International Journal of Press/Politics, over the last decade. A systematic content analysis was conducted to determine the gender ratio of authors, the methods and theories employed, and the ratio of quantitative to qualitative research studies. In addition, we tracked the use of primary or secondary data sources and the prevalence of research funding by gender.

This chapter contributes to research on the strategic use of emotions in political campaigns by gauging the presence of negative rhetoric in the social media posts of congressional candidates. Leveraging a dataset of tweets posted by candidates for the U.S. House during the last two months of the 2018 midterm election, we utilize a dictionary-based automated text analysis program to estimate the amount of negative language used by the candidates. Our results demonstrate that the campaign context can affect the likelihood that candidates use negative rhetoric in their tweets, as does gender and partisanship. Challengers, those in competitive races, losers, women, and Democrats were more likely to use anxious, sad, and angry words in their tweets during the run-up to Election Day 2018.

This chapter tests for whether entertainment media can affect political attitudes using a television series that has received significant attention in the news media for its political undertones: 24. Criticized for its positive portrayal of torture as an information gathering device, 24, with its focus on terrorism, allows for a test on whether attitudes regarding US torture policy change after viewing the series. In a 2006 Fox News broadcast, Laura Ingraham claimed that since Americans love 24, “that is as close to a national referendum that it is okay to use tough tactics as we are ever going to get.” The hypothesis put forth by Fox News is that since people enjoy the series 24, Americans must be pro-torture. The question remains: does watching 24 make individuals more likely to support torture? Using two experiments with undergraduate students, these results show that as suggested by Fox News, those who are exposed to the series become significantly more pro-torture. The effects, however, are not the same for everyone, and vary depending on the year.

In this chapter we examine how Trump and Clinton used Twitter after they won their party’s presidential nomination. In particular we examine whether the candidates engaged in negative “attack” style tweets and whether either candidate used the platform to discuss policy positions. We also investigate whether either was more likely to play the “woman card” on Twitter by discussing issues that disproportionately affect women as a group. We first provide a review of the literature on gender and elections and a summary of the research about women on Twitter. We then briefly describe the context of the 2016 presidential election. Using content analysis of each tweet sent by Trump and Clinton from July 1 through Election Day, we then test whether the two candidates used Twitter in a similar fashion. In the end we show that Clinton did play the “woman card” more than Trump.

This chapter examines the effects of community engagement courses on college students’ political engagement, efficacy, and apathy at Sam Houston State University. Using a unique data set collected at two points in time, this chapter will test whether students become more likely to engage in politics after taking a course that incorporates service learning in the curriculum and whether students become more likely to feel that they can make a difference in government.

While previous studies have explored how candidates use Twitter during elections, little is known regarding the use of Twitter beyond candidate and campaign characteristics. This chapter addresses Twitter adoption and use on three levels: personal, campaign, and district. In exploring these different levels of Twitter adoption and frequency, we are able to examine more of what motivates a candidate to adopt and use this medium as a campaign device. Given what we know from previous research about the Twitter usage of U.S. congressional candidates, in examining district level characteristics, we are able to better understand other important group characteristics that might affect the way candidates approach this medium. Are candidates in districts with younger constituents tweeting more and talking about the same things as candidates who have older constituents, for example? Does the racial composition of the district play a factor in Twitter adoption, frequency, and content? How does Twitter allow for a more even playing field when candidates do not have the ability to raise a large amount of funds? These are but a few questions that this chapter addresses

Previously, I found that during the 2012 election and the following summer months, some members of Congress encouraged their Twitter followers to get engaged by volunteering, registering, and contacting their political officials. This chapter serves as a follow-up to that research by examining the ways in which candidates for the US House and the US Senate encouraged their followers to become civically engaged during the 2014 election on Twitter. This chapter presents the results of a content analysis of every tweet sent by candidates during the last two months of the campaign. Specifically, I showed that (1) civic engagement was discussed on Twitter by US House candidates during the 2012 election; (2) candidates didn’t discuss civic engagement that often (3.4 percent of their total tweets were about civic engagement); and (3) partisanship was a predictor of civic engagement tweets (Democrats sent significantly more tweets about civic engagement). Even with that analysis, there are still unanswered questions. First, I only examined those running for the US House. Do individuals running for the US House spend more time focused on civic engagement activities than those running for the Senate? We might expect this is the case since constitutionally the US House was set up to be the “people’s branch” due to the smaller, more personal, constituency. Second, my previous research examines many aspects of “civic engagement” as defined by the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE), but does not examine the number of tweets sent specifically about voting. I found that very little time is spent by members of Congress on Twitter discussing civic engagement, but this may be because I do not examine whether candidates discuss voting. Finally, my previous work also does not examine all of the candidates for the US House and instead focuses on the winners only. In this follow up, I conduct a content analysis of each tweet sent by all candidates for the US House and US Senate in 2014 (House n = 1,137; Senate n = 140). I re-examine the exact categories given in my previous research as well as one not included, i.e., vote. Examining both electoral and non-electoral aspects of civic engagement will give us a more robust picture regarding whether politicians encourage their followers to participate.

This chapter seeks to answer three questions about the types of tweets members of Congress send their followers on their official Twitter pages. Particularly, what this chapter seeks to uncover is (1) whether members of the House spend any time discussing civic engagement with their followers, (2) how much of their Twitter time (if any) is spent doing this type of tweeting, and (3) whether particular individuals are more or less likely to encourage their followers to become civically engaged. What I find is that representatives do discuss civic engagement activities on Twitter both before and after their elections, but the amount of time spent tweeting about these activities is minimal compared to their total number of tweets. There is also a partisan bias to civic engagement tweets. Democrats send more tweets aimed at engaging their followers in the civic process.