Risa Toha, Ph.D.
risa.toha@wfu.edu
Associate Professor
Wake Forest University
Research Interests
Ethnic Politics
Political Violence
Identity Politics
Electoral Violence
Southeast Asian Politics
Countries of Interest
Indonesia
Singapore
Malaysia
Philippines
Publications:
Journal Articles:
Conventional wisdom maintains that a robust educated middle class is an important factor for a healthy democracy. Recent empirical evidence, however, has shown that there is a significant variation in middle class support for democracy. How do educated elites respond to declines in democracy? To date, we know relatively little about how the educated elites view, talk, and respond as democracy erodes in their country. We address this gap by conducting a discourse analysis of government and educated elites texts in Indonesia from 2010 through 2020. We find that government and educated elites’ discourses on democracy as democracy backslides tend to diverge significantly: While official texts boast of the Indonesia's identity as a Muslim-majority democracy, materials produced by the country's educated middle class express increasing disenchantment with weak political parties, restrictions on freedom of speech, repressive measures toward government critics, and limited checks on executive overreach. Our results suggest that as democracy erodes, government officials’ narratives continue to present the country as a robust democracy, and as such, official narratives alone would not reveal the cracks in democracy in the early stages of decline. Instead, traces of decline are more visible in everyday discourses, where informed citizens express their concerns and criticisms with less fear of reprisals. Rather than standing with the ruling elites, the educated elite authors and producers in our data respond to democratic erosion by resisting and criticizing illiberal measures and demanding greater protection of rights. Our work highlights the importance of an engaged educated middle class who can perceive the subtle erosion in democratic practices and challenge it, both in Indonesia and beyond.
After previous failed attempts, Prabowo Subianto won the 2024 Indonesian presidential election. In this article, we outline the events that unfolded in the run-up to the election before analyzing the drivers of Indonesian voting behaviour based on original survey data. Our analyses underscore the importance of transformations in the generational composition of the Indonesian electorate: younger voters, especially those born after the return of democracy, are fuelling its erosion with their support of a former general accused of human rights abuses. In addition to benefitting from the support of incumbent President Joko Widodo, we argue that Prabowo’s victory was underpinned by a sophisticated social media campaign, the waning memory of Indonesia’s authoritarian past, and a young populace anxious about their economic prospects.
The perceived social acceptability of intolerance is believed to drive individual intolerance, a process we refer to as normalization. Social intolerance can be particularly high during election campaigns, when divisive candidates are likely to disparage minorities and outgroups in their rhetoric. Despite the electoral connection, it remains unclear how normalization interacts with partisanship. Does normalization only affect supporters of intolerant candidates, or does normalization spread across the population—even among supporters of the opposition? Relatedly, are the targets of intolerance group-specific, or are all minorities and outgroups at risk? To address these questions, this paper draws on results from a survey experiment conducted during the 2019 Indonesian presidential election. Our findings suggest that normalization affects all voters, albeit in ways that reflect partisan affiliation and rhetoric, which has implications for the study of identity politicization and the conditions under which intolerance is likely to propagate.
Existing literature on election violence has focused on how violence suppresses voter participation or shapes their preferences. Yet, there are other targets of election violence beyond voters who have so far received little attention: candidates and government agencies. By intimidating rival candidates into dropping out of the race, political hopefuls can literally reduce the number of competitors and increase their likelihood of winning. Likewise, aspiring candidates can target government agencies perceived to be responsible for holding elections to push for electorally beneficial decisions. In this paper, we introduce a new typology of electoral violence and utilize new data of election violence that occur around executive elections in Indonesia from 2005 through 2012. The types of violence we identified differ in these ways: a) Of all cases of electoral violence observed in this article, most incidents were targeted towards candidates and government bodies; b) candidates are generally targeted before elections, whereas voter-targeting incidents are spread out evenly before and after elections and government-targeted violence tends to occur afterwards; c) pre-election violence is concentrated in formerly separatist areas, but post-election violence is more common in districts with prior ethnocommunal violence. These distinctions stress the importance of examining when and why different strategies are adopted.
Conventional wisdom recognizes the prevalence of intergroup clashes during political transition. Most explanations of ethnic riots, however, are based on clashes in mature democracies, and are therefore silent on the dynamics at work during democratic transition. Using district-level data in Indonesia from 1990 through 2005, this article argues that riots tend to occur in ethnically divided districts with low electoral competition because uncompetitiveness in the first democratic elections signals continued regime entrenchment and local political exclusion. As such, riots often follow uncompetitive elections, and dissipate after elections become more competitive and opposition candidates secure electoral victory.
Books Written:
Ethnic riots are a costly and all too common occurrence during political transitions in multi-ethnic settings. Why do ethnic riots occur in certain parts of a country and not others? How does violence eventually decline? Drawing on rich case studies and quantitative evidence from Indonesia between 1990 and 2012, this book argues that patterns of ethnic rioting are not inevitably driven by inter-group animosity, weakness of state capacity, or local demographic composition. Rather, local ethnic elites strategically use violence to leverage their demands for political inclusion during political transition and that violence eventually declines as these demands are accommodated. Toha breaks new ground in showing that particular political reforms―increased political competition, direct local elections, and local administrative units partitioning―in ethnically diverse contexts can ameliorate political exclusion and reduce overall levels of violence between groups.
Book Chapters:
Book Chapter
Book Reviews:
Book Review
Media Appearances:
TV Appearances:
FOCUS interview on the 2017 Jakarta governatorial race
INSIGHT interview on the 2017 Jakarta governor race
Newspaper Quotes:
Comments quoted on increasing illiberal practices in Indonesia